Abstract-Research on vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) is active and ongoing. Proposed applications range from safety applications, and traffic efficiency applications to entertainment applications. Common to many applications is the need to disseminate possibly privacy-sensitive information, such as location and speed information, over larger distances. In-network aggregation is a promising technology that can help to make such privacy-sensitive information only available in the direct vicinity of vehicles instead of communicating it over larger areas. Further away, only aggregated information that is not privacyrelevant anymore will be known. At the same time, aggregation mechanisms help to cope with the limited available wireless bandwidth. However, the exact privacy properties of aggregation mechanisms have still not been thoroughly researched. In this paper, we propose a metric to measure privacy enhancements provided by in-network aggregation and use it to compare existing schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) are an active field of current research, evolving around the idea of using dedicated short range communication (DSRC) to enable direct ad hoc communication between vehicles to exchange messages, thereby enhancing traffic safety, driving efficiency, and providing entertainment services to the drivers. Aspects of VANET research are vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communication. Currently, many research projects and field operational trials prepare the deployment of VANET technology in Europe (e.g., CVIS, DRIVE C2X, simTD), the USA (e.g., VSC), and Japan (e.g., SKY). Infrastructure components, such as road side units placed on the streets in regular intervals, can enhance the penetration rate and connectedness of the network, but their high deployment cost might prove to be inhibitive. Therefore, we will focus on V2V communication in the following. Characteristic for V2V communication are a high node mobility and the fact that all vehicles are both information producers and information consumers. For some applications, this means broadcasting messages to all neighbors in direct communication range, but for other applications this means distributing messages over larger areas using multi hop dissemination protocols. Efficiency applications, such as traffic information systems, in particular profit from large range message dissemination. Similarly, applications that collect hazardous road conditions or provide parking spot availability information need a knowledge base spanning larger regions. Especially for those applications in need of long range message dissemination, preservation of user privacy will be one of the key problems to solve for successful deployment. For almost any VANET application, rich and precise data containing locations, times, and other information, e.g., speed, heading, or planned destination of cars, is necessary. If such data is communicated over larger areas and adversaries are able to collect it, they can build detailed databases containing the exact whereabouts of individuals.
One efficient way to achieve privacy preservation while, at the same time, helping scalability is in-network data aggregation. Here, nodes do not disseminate individual atomic information throughout the network, but instead aggregate information and only disseminate this aggregated information further. Consider an application for the dissemination of traffic jam information. Without aggregation, each vehicle would need to broadcast its speed and position information p i to neighboring vehicles, which would in turn disseminate them further to help approaching vehicles avoid traffic jams; see Figure 1 . This communication pattern would quickly overload the wireless medium and infringe user privacy. All vehicles send out and re-broadcast permanently, disseminating exact information in large regions. Thus, by capturing such messages, adversaries can build large databases with exact location traces with few physical vehicles or road side equipment.
With aggregation, atomic messages containing exact information are only disseminated via single hop broadcast. Receiving vehicles will combine the messages with their own information, resulting in a message that contains traffic information about a road interval instead of a single location; see Figure 2 . Besides the aforementioned traffic jam application, there are many more examples of applications that can profit from in-network aggregation algorithms without sacrificing service quality. Using in-network aggregation inherently aids privacy, because exact information about vehicles is only available in the close vicinity of a vehicle. Only aggregated information, which cannot be used to identify single vehicles, is disseminated over larger areas, thereby achieving a certain anonymity level for the users. However, a clear analysis of the privacy properties provided by aggregation mechanisms is necessary. We propose to extend the notion of a user being anonymous inside a certain group of data sets, known as kanonymity in the database research domain, to express the anonymity depending on the distance of the observer to the observed vehicle. Our contribution in this paper is the definition of a new privacy metric suitable for in-network aggregation, as well as a first approach on describing a best case for user privacy achievable by aggregation mechanisms in relation to privacy achieved by existing aggregation mechanisms found in the literature.
In the following, we will briefly introduce existing data aggregation schemes in Section II before introducing a new metric for the privacy provided by in-network aggregation in Section III. Afterwards, in Section IV, we apply our metric to existing aggregation schemes. Finally, we conclude with an outlook on open research challenges in Section V.
II. RELATED WORK
In-network data aggregation for VANETs is a field that is thoroughly researched. First papers proposed to use a fixedsize segmentation of the road as underlying structure for aggregation decisions. Wischhof et al. introduced the SOTIS traffic information system [1] . The proposed protocol uses periodic beaconing for exchange of traffic information. Received traffic data is aggregated based on road segmentation. For each segment, the average speed is calculated and later forwarded.
Another class of existing schemes is those that use syntactic compression of data. Unlike semantic compression, such as done by SOTIS by averaging data, syntactic compression is fully reversible. Ibrahim and Weigle [2] present a cluster based aggregation scheme suitable for dissemination of traffic information. At local scope in front of a given vehicle, single reports are disseminated and collected using geo-broadcast. This local view is then clustered using fixed size segments and differential coding is used to compress vehicle information in each cluster. The compressed information is then disseminated further. In [3] , the CASCADE system is enhanced with security-, especially integrity-related, features.
A more advanced aggregation scheme is applied in newer aggregation schemes. Instead of relying on a fixed structure of roads, they make aggregation decisions based on the current homogeneity of the traffic. The TrafficView system [4] disseminates information about the average speed of vehicles on the road. In contrast to SOTIS, TrafficView is node-centric, not space-centric. That is, reports of nodes which are close to each other are aggregated by averaging their current speed and position. However, to be able to further identify the nodes, a list of all involved nodes is kept with the aggregate. The aim of this approach is to get an estimated view on the set of surrounding vehicles. To decide the granularity of the aggregation, two algorithms are proposed: a ratio-based and a cost-based. The authors of TrafficView evaluate their system using different metrics that judge the knowledge of a vehicle about its surrounding road network as well as the accuracy of the aggregation.
Lochert et al. [5] take a hierarchical approach on aggregating free parking slots using globally known map data for segmentation. One major advantage of their system is the usage of an adapted version of Flajolet-Martin sketches to achieve a probabilistic but duplicate insensitive sum of free parking spaces. Aggregates can therefore be arbitrarily combined and re-combined without counting free parking slots multiple times.
Dietzel et al. [6] describe an aggregation scheme that focuses on flexible decision metrics. Fuzzy logic rules are employed to base aggregation decisions on qualitative metrics, such as induced quality loss due to aggregation. The resulting scheme aggregates data more where the road network state is homogenous, yet allots more bandwidth to stretches with high state entropy.
Scheuermann et al. [7] provide a theoretical scalability bound for aggregation protocols in VANETs. The main result is that the data rate must be reduced asymptotically faster than the squared distance to the information source (i.e., O(1/d 2 )) to be able to scale to larger deployments. Also, the authors provide a construction framework for a mechanism achieving the claimed rate.
Privacy aspects of VANET aggregation have been mentioned by Sampigethaya et al. [8] , however they restrict themselves to syntactic aggregation. In a later paper, Sampigethaya et al. [9] introduce aggregation of location data inside groups of vehicles for enhancing privacy when using location based services. However, their approach is targeted towards infrastructure-supported (i.e., V2I) communication. For semantic in-network aggregation, there are currently no thorough assessments of privacy implications.
III. METRICS
Intuitively, in-network aggregation is privacy friendly in the sense that no exact information about single vehicles is communicated to areas further away. Instead, exact information items of several vehicles are combined and only aggregated information, such as averages, is communicated. This step is necessary and essential for aggregation to cope with bandwidth limitations of the wireless medium. However, beyond this intuitive notion, the exact gain in privacy due to aggregation has not been formulated so far. Therefore, we will introduce a new metric, which we call k-anonymity over distance. The kanonymity metric has been introduced in the database research domain by Sweeney [10] . k-anonymity is a simple metric that can be used to express the indistinguishability of personal information stored in databases. Instead of only basing the kanonymity on information that directly identifies individuals, Sweeney uses the notion of quasi-identifiers first introduced by Dalenius [11] . Quasi identifiers are tuples of information that suffice to identify individuals. For instance, a combination of birth place, birth date, and full name will uniquely identify a person. Given a table T (a 1 , . . . , a n ) with attributes a 1 , . . . , a n , and a subset of attributes sufficing to identify individuals that table rows originate from QI T , T (a 1 , . . . , a n ) is said to satisfy k-anonymity if and only if each sequence of values in the projection of T to only the quasi identifier attributes T [QI T ] appears with at least k occurrences.
Given a static, centralistic database, k-anonymity can be decided. However, in a vehicular network, information changes over time and different subsets of the total knowledge are known at different points in the network. Moreover, vehicles travel through the network, physically transporting knowledge from one part of the network to another. Assuming that new exact information is constantly generated by vehicles, we can neglect time in our considerations. At each point in time, new and unaggregated information will be broadcast by vehicles in their one-hop neighborhood and, at the same time, more aggregated information about each vehicle travels through the network. Moreover, old information expires after a certain amount of time and is not disseminated further by aggregation schemes. Therefore, we can assume the amount of information with different privacy sensitivity properties to be constant throughout time. However, it varies depending on the distance to the originating vehicle. Also, we will neglect vehicle mobility in our considerations. Even with high relative vehicle speeds on motorways (e.g., 150 km/h in opposite directions), the speed of information dissemination by physical transport is negligible in comparison to the possible wireless transmission dissemination speed.
Therefore, we propose to use k-anonymity over distance as a suitable metric for measuring the privacy aspects of innetwork aggregation, adopting the database-centric definition of k-anonymity in the following way. Let V be the particular vehicle that we want to analyze the privacy of. Let S V := {s 1 V , . . . , s n V } be a set of sensor values read from a car's in-vehicle sensors and that are potentially privacy sensitive, e.g., currently driven speed, location, and time. If another vehicle receives this exact information or can reconstruct it uniquely, k-anonymity is 1. However, other vehicles receiving S V will aggregate the values with their own sensor values S i by applying an aggregation function: Y = f (S V , S 1 , . . . , S n ). After aggregation, we say that the resulting value Y provides k-anonymity if at least k sensor tuples from other vehicles were used in the calculation and if f is not invertible, even given partial knowledge about the input values. Such partial knowledge is very common in aggregation schemes. For instance, vehicles have exact information available for all other cars in their one-hop neighborhood. Now suppose, a vehicle v receives an aggregated value from another vehicle w, which is at the far end of v's wireless reception range. Now v nows the exact input values for some of the information that w used for aggregation, but not for all of them. This partial information can be used by v to reconstruct the other, unknown, input values if the aggregation function is invertible. More formally, assume that a receiver knows a subset X ⊂ S := {S V , S 1 , . . . , S n } in addition to Y . Then it should hold that
where I is the mutual information. Note that the average function, for instance, does not meet this requirement. Given Y = f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) := x 1 + · · · + x n n and knowing x 1 , . . . , x n−1 , and n, x n can be easily calculated:
Even if less values x i ∈ {x 1 , . . . , x n } are known, the unknown values can still be narrowed down to a smaller range. Similarly when f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) := min(x 1 , . . . , x n ), then x n is known if x 1 , . . . , x n−1 , Y are known and ∀x i ∈ {x 1 , . . . , x n−1 } : x i > Y . Therefore, great attention needs to be payed when choosing the aggregation functions for a particular aggregation scheme.
Further, let N be the average number of vehicles in direct communication range of each other, i.e., the number of each vehicle's 1-hop neighbors and let r be the radius of one vehicle's communication range. Now we can calculate the kanonymity over distance for a highway scenario in the best case for privacy. We will use three more assumptions besides the aforementioned requirement on the aggregation function used. First, we assume that maximum aggregation is used in the sense that, given two items, the protocol always chooses to aggregate these two items and only the most aggregated items are disseminated further. Note that this will not be the case in real schemes, because quality requirements of applications dictate the granularity of aggregation decisions, together with bandwidth requirements. Second, we assume that all vehicles, including possible attackers, behave according to the aggregation protocol and only protocol-compliant information is communicated. In the case of maximum aggregation, this means that only the aggregated information and no additional, more detailed information is communicated. Third, we assume that the aggregation scheme in question uses exact information to bootstrap aggregation, which is then used to build more aggregated information during dissemination. This means that a scheme starts with exact sensor readings of particular vehicles instead of directly sending out already coarsened or aggregated information. Most of the aggregation schemes currently proposed in literature follow this blueprint. Figure 3 shows the calculation of the best possible kanonymity over distance. After one beacon interval bi, each vehicle has sent out its own sensor tuple. It is received by all N vehicles within the communication radius r. For the next beacon, all vehicles on the road know the sensor tuples of all their N neighbors. Because of the maximum aggregation assumption, the vehicles at the border of V's communication range will now broadcast aggregated tuples of the form f (S V , S 1 , . . . , S N −1 ) with k = N . Again, one beacon interval further, vehicles will have received another aggregated information from vehicles not priorly in communication range. Therefore they disseminate combined aggregates of the form
Note that we only look at those communication paths that have the lowest hop count from V to a given receiving vehicle. That is, those communication paths that are established by nodes at the border of the wireless reception range, as denoted by the highlighted nodes in Figure 3 . At the same time, communication paths with a larger hop count can exist, but they necessarily result in higher values for k d due to the maximum aggregation assumption.
Therefore the k-anonymity over distance in the best case is
where d is the distance between the observer and V in meters, independent of the specific aggregation scheme used.
IV. EXAMPLES
The presented bound describes the maximum possible level of k-anonymity over distance. However, existing aggregation schemes do not necessarily reach this level of k-anonymity. We will discuss the k-anonymity over distance of selected existing mechanisms in the following.
The SOTIS aggregation protocol [1] was one of the first in-network aggregation mechanisms proposed for VANETs. It uses a fixed size road segmentation as aggregation structure. Figure 4 shows the level of privacy achieved. Vehicles continuously send out sensor tuples containing exact information to their one-hop neighborhood. Therefore k d is 1 for d ≤ r. For the two-hop neighbors, i.e., r ≤ d ≤ 2r, k d is N , because SOTIS only disseminates aggregated information to further away nodes. For d > 2r, k d rises again to 2N in Figure 4 , because we assume a segment size of 2r. Afterwards, k d stays constant, because SOTIS does not perform hierarchical aggregation on already aggregated information. Therefore, the SOTIS system in general achieves for a segment size of s. Note that this calculation still assumes equation 1 to hold, which is not the case for the average function used by SOTIS, as argued in Section III. The CASCADE approach [2] is fundamentally different from SOTIS. Instead of averaging values, all information is aggregated in a lossless fashion. Therefore, any receiver can calculate the exact sensor tuples of each vehicle given the output of the aggregation function. Moreover, CASCADE chooses to disseminate exact sensor information of vehicles in a 1.5 km radius without performing any aggregation. However, information is only disseminated further in the direction of traffic flow. Therefore, the CASCADE system achieves
where ∞ denotes that no information about V is available in particular regions due to decisions of the aggregation scheme rather than due to limitations of the communication channel. The authors of CASCADE published a follow-up paper addressing security, mainly integrity, but not enhancing privacy properties [3] .
TrafficView [4] , as well as a Fuzzy-Logic-based aggregation scheme proposed by Dietzel et al. [6] represent a third category of aggregation schemes. Unlike the two previously discussed aggregation schemes, these do not rely on a fixed segmentation structure, but instead dynamically aggregate information according to quality-related parameters, such as the error induced by averaging information. Therefore, k d cannot be determined during design time of the system, but can only be measured during runtime. Because both systems will aggregate information of vehicles with similar properties, e.g., similar speed, they will approximate the optimal k d in homogenous traffic situations such as a traffic jam or free flowing traffic on a road. However, in less homogenous situations or when particular vehicles stand out, the k-anonymity over distance for these particular vehicles will be low. This could mean, for instance, that information about a vehicle speeding on a road where all other vehicles adhere to a substantially lower speed limit could be easily identified. While, from an application point of view, especially this information, which is deviating form the norm, is often important, it can have bad results for the privacy of affected drivers. One possible countermeasure for this problem is to dynamically monitor k d values during runtime and artificially coarsen information from vehicles if necessary.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we extend the well known k-anonymity metric to k-anonymity over distance, making it suitable for gauging the privacy qualities of in-network aggregation mechanisms for VANETs. We argued that the achievable privacy, obviously, relates to the node density and also to the wireless transmission range. The latter means that, no matter how much information is aggregated within a particular i-hop neighborhood of a vehicle, all vehicles within the same transmission range will always have access to the least aggregated information available to them. In particular, this means for the 1-hop, i.e., direct, neighborhood of a car that all vehicles in transmission range will have access to exact and unaggregated information of that car. Despite being necessary for bootstrapping the aggregation and further information dissemination process, it can be argued that this information is likely necessary for supporting fundamental services of a VANET, as well. For instance, beaconing, that is, periodic one-hop broadcasting of position, time, and other status information, is a vital service that many more advanced VANET applications build upon. This beaconing service provides the same possibly privacy sensitive information that is used to bootstrap many aggregation protocols. It is therefore fair to assume that the privacy trade-offs imposed by exact information being available in the direct vicinity have to be accepted. However, capturing this information requires a high physical effort by using cars to physically follow a target vehicle or a high criminal effort by trying to gain control over a sufficiently high percentage of cars on the road to gain access to their locally stored information. Therefore, availability of exact information in the close vicinity is likely acceptable.
However, the further information moves away from a target vehicle, the harder it is to identify information of a single vehicle anymore, given that suitable aggregation schemes are used. In the best case, k-anonymity over distance grows linearly with increasing distance, though not all existing schemes reach this best case. Non-hierarchical schemes, as well as schemes that only compress syntactically fail for obvious reasons. However, even more recent schemes show problematic properties. Because of their dynamic nature, no hard guarantees on k-anonymity over distance can be made at deployment time. To overcome this problem, two strategies are possible: runtime measurement of k d , including proper measures to artificially enhance it if necessary, or moving away from schemes that bootstrap with exact information.
If k d is to be measured during runtime, a remote trust establishment between vehicles is necessary. Before exact information is sent out, a protocol needs to ensure that the receiving vehicles will indeed aggregate the information further and not re-broadcast the exact information. Such a remote trust establishment process is difficult due to the fact that all information is broadcasted and receivers are not known beforehand due to the high mobility of nodes. Similarly, achieving aggregation without using exact information to bootstrap the process is difficult, because no collaborative, multiround protocols are possible due to high vehicle mobility.
Moreover, the specific privacy properties of aggregation functions need to be assessed in future work. As we have argued, the commonly used average function does not provide the privacy-preserving properties that are necessary. The main problem here is that nodes do not only possess the final result of aggregation functions, but, due to the dynamic nature of in-network aggregation protocols, almost always also know partial exact values that were used in the calculation.
We have taken a first step from the intuitive privacy notion of in-network aggregation towards a formal model for describing, measuring, enforcing, and enhancing privacy properties. Examples show that existing schemes are promising, but far from reaching optimal characteristics. As next steps, we plan to develop our metric further, incorporating more advanced privacy measures, as well as to work on theoretic bounds of privacy-preservation and using the gained knowledge to enhance existing schemes.
